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RECORDS AUTHORIZED BY THE FEDERAL YOUTH

CORRECTIONS

ACT-Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Doe v. Webster a presented the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia with an opportunity to fully examine the scope
of' the "set aside" provision of the Federal Youth Corrections Act
(YCA). 2 The plaintiff sought complete destruction of all arrest and
conviction records arising out of a marijuana conviction which had
been set aside pursuant to the YCA.
On January 18, 1971, John Doe pleaded guilty in the United
States District Court for the District of Arizona to a federal marijuana
of ense. 3 As a minor, Doe was convicted and sentenced under the
YCA to commitment for treatment and supervision in the custody of'

the Attorney General.

4

Doe's sentence was suspended several

months later and, pursuant to section 5010(a) of the YCA, he was
placed on probation for a five-year period. 5 On June 5, 1973, the
sentencing court unconditionally discharged Doe from the three years
remaining on his probationary period. This discharge operated under
section 5010(b) of the Act to automatically set aside Doe's conviction,
6
and the court issued a certificate to that effect.
Four years later Doe filed suit in district court to enjoin the
maintenance and dissemination of all records arising out of his arrest
and conviction. 7 The suit also sought the expungement of all records
1 606 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
2 18 U.S.C. § 5005 (1976).

3 606 F.2d at 1229.
Doe was convicted under 26 U.S.C. S 4744(a)(2) "for feloniously facilitating the transportation and concealment of marijuana, without having obtained a permit, and without having paid
the special tax required thereon." 26 U.S.C. § 4744(a)(2) (1976). Joint Appendix to the Briefs for
Appellant at 4, Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1979) [hereinafter Appendix].
4 Doe was committed to federal prison. Appendix, supra note 3, at 73.
5
youth
tence
6

606 F.2d at 1229. The applicable section provides: "If the court is of the opinion that the
offender does not need commitment, it may suspend the imposition or execution of senand place the youth offender on probation." 18 U.S.C. § 5010(a) (1969).
606 F.2d at 1229. The YCA reads:

Where a youth offender has been placed on probation by the court, the court may
thereafter, in its discretion, unconditionally discharge such youth offender from
probation prior to the expiration of the maximum period of probation theretofore
fixed by the court, which discharge shall automatically set aside the conviction, and
the court shall issue to the youth offender a certificate to that effect.
18 U.S.C. § .5021(b) (1976).
7 606 F.2d at 1229. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia against the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Attorney General of
the United States, and the Secretary of the Treasury [hereinafter referred to collectively as the
government]. Id.
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in the government's possession pertaining to the arrest and conviction. 8
At the time the suit was filed, Doe was a third year law student. 9 He averred in his complaint that the maintenance of these
records was having an adverse effect on his employment and career
opportunities. Specifically, he was hesitant to seek federal employment for fear that the records would be discovered and employment
consequently denied. 10 Furthermore, Doe had been told by one
federal court judge that his conviction, even though it had been set
aside, "would be an absolute bar to the practice of law in that
state."

11

The government's motion to dismiss was granted by the district
court upon a determination that the YCA does not authorize a court
to expunge criminal records. It was held that the purpose of the Act
was to remove only "certain legal disabilities which could otherwise
attach to a youth offender."12 In the court's opinion, it was clear
that the Act was not intended to be an expungement statute, since
the legislature failed to provide for the deletion of records following
13
the setting aside of a conviction.
8 1d. In the complaint, Doe petitioned the district court to "[e]njoin defendants to physically destroy any and all existing records that grow out of, refer to, or are otherwise related to
the investigation, arrest, conviction or post-conviction treatment of plaintiff." Appendix, supra
note 3, at 7.
Doe also sought a declaratory judgment that § 5021(b) prohibits the maintenance of criminal records arising out of prior arrests. Since his conviction had been set aside by operation of
the Act, Doe claimed the right to state on ans and all job applications that he had never been
arrested for, nor convicted of, a crime. 606 F.2d at 1229.
Further, Doe sought to enjoin the government's dissemination of any information derived
from the record of his arrest to an\ person or agency. This request included -all law enfi)rcement
agencies or employers which might inquire as to Doe's criminal record. Appendix, supra note
3, at 7.
9 Appendix, supra note 3, at 74. In 1977, Doe graduated cui laude from Harvard Law
School.
10 606 F2d at 1229. Doe alleged in his complaint that the government's maintenance of his
criminal records has a -chilling effect" on his exercise of rights guaranteed under the first,
fourth, fifth and ninth amendments to the United States Constitution. Appendix, supra note 3,
at 5.
Doe also claimed reluctance "to move to new areas or to consider new employment opportunities for fear that his record will be exposed and his career compromised." Id. at 6. In
addition to career opportunities affected by the maintenance of his criminal records, Doe also
alleged that he "risks exposure . . . every time he applies for . . . credit, insurance, or a
myriad of other benefits." Id.
" Brief for Appellant at 5, Doe v. Webster. 606 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
12 Appendix, supra note 3, at 79.
13 606 F.2d at 1229. The district court stated that '[i]f Congress had intended that § 5021
mandate expunction, it could have expressly provided so." Appendix, supra note 3, at 78-79.
Accordingly, the lower court held that it did not have the authority under the YCA to order
expungement. Id.
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The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court with respect to the records arising out of
Doe's arrest, concluding that such records cannot be destroyed under
the YCA.1 4 Drawing a distinction between arrest records and conviction records, however, the court reversed the lower court's holding
that records of a conviction set aside pursuant to the Act cannot be
expunged.' 5 The court held that such records must be removed
from general access in order to fully effectuate the purpose of the
Act. 16

It was acknowledged that while a court has the inherent authority to delete or destroy a defendant's criminal record, certain conditions must first be present. A court generally will not invoke its
inherent power unless there has been some governmental misconduct
which deprived the defendant of a guaranteed right. 17 No such conduct was present here; to the contrary, Doe pleaded guilty to the
crime charged. 18 Thus, if the court were to order Doe's records destroyed, the authority would have to come from the provisions of the
Act.
The court founded its holding on the recognition that the YCA is
an expungement statute. "Expungement" was defined by the court as
"connot[ing] the removal of records from the general mass of law enforcement files where they are most likely to be accessible to the
public."19 Accordingly, the court detailed a system of maintaining
records of set aside convictions separately from other criminal records, but leaving them available for legitimate law enforcement pur20
poses.
The YCA was passed in 1950 "to give youthful ex-offenders a
fresh start, free from the stain of a criminal conviction, and an opportunitv to clean their slates to -afford them a second chance, in terms of
both jobs and standing in the community." 2 1 Enactment of the YCA
14

606 F.2d at 1230.

15 Id. at 1232-33.
16 Id.

at 1244-45.

17 Id.
18 606
19 Id.
20 1d.

at 1232. See note 69 infra and accompanying text.
F.2d at 1229.
at 1241.
at 1244. The court held that once a district court orders the conviction set aside, the

FBI must actually segregate the conviction records from other files.
Prior to this decision, the FBI and other agencies which had possession of criminal files
freely disseminated them upon request. Convictions set aside pursuant to the YCA were
marked "set aside" on the face of the records. Id. at 1238 n.48.

21 Id. at 1234-35. As originally written, the YCA provided that, upon discharge, the conviction was to

"

'be automatically set aside and held for naught.' " Id. at 1235. This language was
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followed the finding that, between ages sixteen and twenty-two, "special factors operat[e] to produce habitual criminals." 22 Congress recognized that the methods and facilities available for treating criminally inclined youth were ineffective in preventing the youths from
23
repeatedly running afoul of the law.
Through the YCA, Congress vested trial judges with discretion as
to whether a youth is to be sentenced under the Act.2 4 Alternative
sentences are available once the judge has determined that the youth
will benefit by application of the Act. The offender may be sentenced
to probation, to the custody of the Attorney General for supervision,
later replaced b a clause providing for the issuance of a certificate "hav[ing] the same legal
effect as a pardon." Correctional System for Youth Offenders: Hearings on S. 1114 and S. 2609
Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1949)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings].
This provision, allowing for the certificate to have the effect of a pardon, was stricken
during the 1949 hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee. An explanation offered by the
Webster court for the wording change is that Congress believed that the pardon provision
"would not effectively provide the youthful offender with the clean slate intended by the drafters." 606 F.2d at 1235.
"A pardon is an act of grace bv the chief executive (president or governor)." Schaefer, The
Federal Youth Corrections Act: The Purposes and Uses of Vacating the Conviction, 39 FED.
PROBATIO.,N 31, 32 (Sept. 1975). Through a pardon, a person is released from further disabilities
or punishment which would normally result from a conviction. The main difference between a
pardon and expungement is that with a pardon, the fact of conviction is not eliminated. Id. at
32.
Professor Schaefer presents the following theory on why the framers omitted the pardon
provision:
Before enactment, the reference to pardons was deleted from the bill because
the senators believed that it would be an interference with the president's clemency
power. Since the Constitution grants the pardoning power only to the president,
the committee correctly understood that Congress does not have the power itself
and cannot delegate it to any other body.
Id.
22 Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 433 (1974).
23 See Hearings, supra note 21, at 9. See also United States v. Fryer, 402 F. Supp. 831
(N.D. Ohio 1975). It was there recognized that the YCA departs from the traditional punitive
theories of dealing with Youth. Noting that the underlying purpose of the Act is rehabilitative,
the court stated that "[i]t is predicated on the concept that criminal youths require special
treatment because of the number and kinds of offenses they commit and because of the promise
they hold out for success through correctional treatment." Id. at 837.
24 18 U.S.C. § 5010(d) (1976). Under present case law, the YCA requires a federal district
court denying sentencing under the Act to affirmatively find that the youth being sentenced
would not benefit by it. See Brager v. United States, 527 F.2d 895 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc),
which held that if the sentencing judge can
conscientiously . . . make current explicit findings to the effect that at the time of
sentence he was familiar with the Act, that he was aware that the defendant was a
person eligible for treatment under the Act, that consideration was in fact given to
employing the Act with respect to the defendant, and that it was determined at the
time that the defendant would not benefit from treatment under the Act, the requirement of Dorszynski is adequately satisfied.
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or to prison. 2 5 If the youth then remains out of trouble, the court
can order the sentence discharged, automatically setting aside the
youth's conviction.26
The set aside provision in the Act was intended to minimize the
stigma which accompanies a conviction on a youth's record, particularly as it -affects employment opportunities. When framing the Act,
Congress considered this a vital provision. The Senate subcommittee
heard statements that the Act wipes out the conviction "if the youth
is discharged, rehabilitated and behaves himself [well] after his period
of supervision." 2 7 A legislator proposed that a youth "who makes
subone mistake should be permanently forgiven that mistake if his
2 8
behavior."
his
changed
has
he
that
sequent conduct indicates
While Congress was specific as to the Act's purpose, the legislative history is silent as to the meaning of the term set aside. Therefore, the Act offers no guidance in determining whether it was intended to result in the destruction of a youth's conviction records.
The legislative intent regarding these records must be discerned
through an interpretation of what Congress would have provided had
it addressed the issue.
Although the YCA has been in existence for thirty years, the
precise effect to be given a conviction set aside has never been full\,
examined. 2 9 Several courts have, however, addressed the issue of

Id.at 898-99. See also Williams v. United States, 476 F.2d 970, 972 (3d Cir. 1973) (suggesting
that finding of no benefit required in section 5010 be made in open court so trial transcript will
clearly show determination was made).
The Supreme Court has refused to go further by requiring a district court to explain why it
chose not to sentence under the Act. Once it is clear that the lower court considered the option
of sentencing under the YCA, appellate review of that issue ends. Dorszwnski v. United States,

418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974).
25 18 U.S.C. § 5010(a), (b), (c), (d) (1976).
26 18 U.S.C. § 5021(b) (1976).
27 Hearings, supra note 21, at 70 (statement of Chief Judge Orie L. Phillips). Chief
Judge Orie L. Phillips of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated that

the purpose of having the conviction set aside "isto help [the youth] get a job and keep him
from having to be turned down by a prospective employer because of the fact that he has a
conviction." Id. See also Utz v. Cullinane, 520 F.2d 467, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Morrow v.
District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ("The main evil produced by dissemination
of arrest records thus seems to be the adverse effect on job opportunity.') Id. at 742; Gough,

The Expungement of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult Offenders: A Problem of
Status, 1966 WASH. U.L.Q. 147, 153 (examination of extent of effect of arrest on employment
opportunities).
28 Hearings, supra note 21, at 117.
29 The Act has been the subject of litigation in numerous instances. The constitutionality of
the YCA was upheld in United States v. Baker, 429 F.2d 1334 (7th Cir. 1970), against a claim
that the vague standards given in the Act result in "unconstitutional abdications of the congres-
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whether the YCA was intended to be an expungement statute. As
used in these cases, "expunge" means to obliterate or destroy. 30 In
each, the youth sentenced under the Act sought to have records
either made unavailable for any purpose or physically destroyed.
The leading case involving the power of a court to delete records
of set aside convictions is United States v. McMains. 3 1 In McMains,
the youth pleaded guilty to a charge that he failed to report the robbery of a federally insured bank. He was sentenced to probation
under the YCA and was later unconditionally discharged from that
conviction.32
A district court order expunging McMains's conviction record
was reversed by the Eighth Circuit, which concluded that Congress
had not intended to authorize the expungement of criminal records.
The court reasoned that, because the Act does not specifically provide
for expungement following the setting aside of a conviction, the legislature did not intend it to be an expungement statute. This reasoning
was supported by the YCA provision authorizing a certificate to be
issued to the youth upon discharge, indicating the conviction had
been set aside. 3 3 The court noted that a certificate would be unnecessary if all conviction records were destroyed upon the discharge
of the youth's sentence. Moreover, it stated that a court has no
statutory authority to destroy criminal records, even when an arrest
results in an acquittal. 34 The court concluded that it would be incongruous to infer such a statutory intent in the YCA, absent an indi35
cation that Congress intended this treatment of the record.
sional obligation to set standards and specify policies capable of administration by the federal
courts." Id. at 1346. The court held that subjective decisions reserved to the trial judge were

intended by Congress, thus authorizing the wide latitude given the Act. Id. at 1347.
The duty of a judge to specifically find that a youth will not benefit by sentencing under
the Act before declining to so sentence has also been an issue. See note 24 supra. See also
United States v. Danc,, 510 F.2d 779, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d
334, 337 (4th Cir. 1973) (en banc).
'0 See United States v. Doe, 556 F.2d 391, 393 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. McMains,
540 F.2d 387, 389 (8th Cir. 1976); Fite v. Retail Credit Co., 386 F. Supp. 1045, 1047 (D.
Mont. 1975).
31 540 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1976). See also Comment, Expungenient of Criminal Records
Under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 62 IowA L. REv. 547 (1976), where the author
examines the Mclains decision in light of legislative history and past case law involving the
Act.
32 540 F.2d at 387-88. McMains was sentenced to three vears' probation under the YCA.
He served his sentence, and thereupon his conviction was automatically discharged. Id.
33 Id. at 389.
34 Id. See Coleman v. United States Dep't of Justice, 429 F. Supp. 411, 413 (N.D. Ind.
1977) ("the mere fact that a person is not convicted on the charges for which he was arrested
does not automatically entitle . . . [him] to an expungement of that record."). Id.
35 540 F.2d at 389.
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In the view of the McMains court, by framing the YCA as it did,
"Congress has chosen to strike a balance between rehabilitation of
youthful offenders and the important societal interests served by
criminal record-keeping." 3 6 Although the Act was found to be effective in striking such a balance, the court conceded that deleting conviction records would further advance the purposes of the Act. 3 7
In United States v. Doe, 38 the Sixth Circuit assumed a position
similar to that of the McMains court. The youth in United States v.
Doe was sentenced to probation under the YCA for embezzling from
a federally insured bank. 3 9 It was decided that a youth is not entitled to have his conviction records removed once his sentence is discharged and he has received the mandated certificate. The court held
that the youth was entitled only to have all conviction records clearly
40
reflect the set aside status of his conviction.
As in McMains, the court in United States v. Doe relied upon a
finding that the YCA does not specifically permit expungement. Recognizing that the purpose of the Act is "to enhance the probability of
rehabilitation of youthful offenders," 41 the court believed Congress
would have nonetheless expressly provided for the removal if it had
intended to accomplish its aim through the destruction of conviction
records. 4 2 Although the court acknowledged that the YCA has been
36 Id. The court considered itself bound by what it perceived to be the legislative intent in
enacting the YCA. Thus, the court declined to grant expungement, even upon a recognition of
its inherent power to do so. It held that while the power to expunge is within its ambit, it is a
narrow power and not routinely used. Id. at 389-90.
37 Id. See notes 21-27 supra and accompanying text for the stated purposes for the enacfment of the YCA.
38 556 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1977).
39 Id. at 392. Defendant was placed on probation for two years. Approximately 17 months
after sentencing, he petitioned the sentencing court for an unconditional discharge from probation pursuant to section 5021(b) of the Act. The district court granted that portion of defendant's
petition, but refused to order the records of the conviction destroved. Id.
40 Id. at 393. The court noted that 28 U.S.C. § 534 "require[s] the FBI to take reasonable
measures to safeguard the accuracy of information in its criminal files which is subject to dissemination." Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1970). See Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116, 1122-23
(D.C. Cir. 1974) where the court stated:
To permit the FBI to disseminate inaccurate criminal information without the FBI
making reasonable efforts to prevent inaccuracy would be tantamount to permission
to accuse individuals of criminal conduct without ever providing such individuals an
opportunity to disprove that accusation.
Id. at 1123. See also Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1027-28 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Shadd v.
United States, 389 F. Supp. 721, 724 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
41 556 F.2d at 392.

42 Id. at 393. The court in United States v. Doe found the rationale of McMains "convincing." Id. It noted that had Congress intended the YCA to be an expungement statute, it "could
easily have provided for expungement." Id.
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called an expungement statute by other courts, it held the Act to be
so only to the extent that it sets aside or annuls a conviction. The
court further stated that the destruction of conviction records is unnecessary to effectuate the purposes of the Act because the automatic
discharge and issuance of the certificate combine to offer "a unique
43
shield from the prejudicial effects of a criminal conviction."
A different approach was taken by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in an earlier examination of the YCA expungement issue. In Stevenson v. United States, 4 4 the court employed a
literal reading of the statute to deny destruction of the records. Since
section 5006(h) of the Act defines "conviction" as "the judgment on a
verdict or finding of guilty, a plea of guilty, or a plea of nolo contendere," 4 5 the court stated that, according to the plain language of the
46
Act, no more than the judgment need be set aside.
The youth in Stevenson claimed that fingerprints which had been
used to show complicity in a crime were erroneously admitted as evidence. The prints had been identified by comparison with prints
taken in a prior arrest. That arrest had resulted in a conviction which
had been subsequently set aside. 4 7 The youth claimed that fingerprints taken as a result of the arrest could not be used in a later
48
proceeding.
The Stevenson court found that the Act was not meant to prohibit the later use of physical evidence arising out of a conviction.
The court ruled that application of the YCA neither changes the fact
that the youth had been arrested, fingerprinted, and photographed,
49
nor does it erase such facts.
Fite v. Retail Credit Co. 5 0 concerned the issue of whether a conviction which has been set aside may be revealed to later inquirers.
43 Id.
44 380 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

45 18 U.SC. § 5006(h) (now codified at 18 U.S.C. § 5006(g) (1976)).
46 380 F.2d at 593. The court recognized that the Act was meant to be applied to a youth
deemed by the sentencing court to be a proper subject of rehabilitation. By remaining outof
trouble, the youth "may be spared the lifelong burden of a criminal record." Id. The setting
aside of the conviction of a youth can operate to his great advantage and, thus, it alone can go
far toward meeting the Act's objectives. Id.

47 Id. at 593 n.8. The initial identification of the youth had been accomplished by comparing
fingerprints taken from the scene of a robbery with those already in police files. Id. at 593.
48 Id. at 593.
49 Id. at 593-94. It was pointed out that the set aside provision is far from inconsequential. Id.
at 593 & n.ll. For example, the court noted that where penalties for the violation of a statute
increase according to the number of times a person is convicted of violating that statute, having
the first conviction set aside will result in a lesser penalty for subsequent convictions than would
have been imposed had it not been set aside. Id. at 593 n.l.
5o 386 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Mont. 1975).
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In Fite, the appellant had lost his job as a result of the respondent's
credit report which was commissioned by the appellant's employer.
The report showed a theft conviction which had been set aside pur51
suant to the YCA.
In holding that a set aside conviction may be revealed in reports
of this nature, the District Court for the District of Montana contrasted the YCA with the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974.52 The key difference between the two statutes is
that the YCA does not expressly prohibit the disclosure of records,
while the Juvenile Justice Act does. 53 This distinction led the court
to reason that Congress had not intended the YCA to prevent, for all
purposes, the disclosure of records which involved a set aside conviction. 54 The court determined that when a defendant pleads guilty,
he admits to having committed the crime; the mere fact that the
youth was sentenced under the YCA "does not change the quality of
the admission because a defendant pleads guilty to the crime
55
charged, not to a violation of the [YCA]."
While not specifically addressing the expungement issue, other
courts have taken a broader view of the Act. These courts have held
that the YCA is an expungement statute designed to relieve the offender of all disabilities attending a criminal conviction.
The First Circuit, in Mestre Morera v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Service, 56, was confronted with a deportation
51

Id.

at 1046. Plaintiff commenced an action in which he sought a declaration prohibiting

defendant from either maintaining any records, or reporting facts concerning the arrest and
conviction to any of its customers. Id. Plaintiff had been convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 641
(theft of government property), after entering a plea of guilty. He was sentenced under the YCA
to probation for one year and later was unconditionally discharged from probation prior to its
expiration. 386 F. Supp. at 1046.
52 386 F. Supp. 1046-47, citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5751 (1978).
-3 The Juvenile Justice Act provides that -[r]ecords containing the identity of individual
youths pursuant to this chapter may under no circumstances be disclosed or transferred to any

individual or to any public or private agency." 42 U.S.C. § 5731 (1978).
54 386 F. Supp. at 1046-47. The court noted that the public has an interest in knowing the

facts of court proceedings, and that traditionally the records arising out of such proceedings are
open for public inspection. This was found to be so even in criminal actions where the case is
later dismissed or a judgment of acquittal entered. Id. at 1046.

The Fite court examined the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, upon which
defendant based his claim. It found that the Reporting Act intended that "consumer reporting
agencies will report matters of public record which may have an adverse effect upon a consumer's ability to obtain employment and refers specifically to records relating to 'arrest, indictment, or conviction.' " 386 F. Supp. at 1047.
5 386 F. Supp. at 1047.
56 462 F.2d 1030 (1st Cir. 1972). Plaintiff was convicted of conspiring to possess marijuana
known to be unlawfully imported and was sentenced to the custody of the Attorney General
under section 5010(b) of the YCA. Id. at 1031.
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proceeding based on a set aside conviction. The court held that conviction records which had been set aside could not be used to support
deportation proceedings. It further found that the purpose behind the
automatic setting aside of a youth's conviction is not only to remove
"the usual disabilities of a criminal conviction, but also to give him a
second chance free of a record tainted by such a conviction."57
The holding in Mestre Morera demonstrates a strong reliance on

the court's interpretation of the legislative intent behind the Act. The
court felt this intent would not be realized if the application of the
Act simply resulted in a "technical erasure" of the youth's conviction.
Instead, the court understood the YCA to wipe the youth's slate
clean. 58 The court noted that without the hinderance of a conviction
record, the youth is granted "an opportunity to atone for ... [his]

youthful indiscretions."59
60
A similar conclusion was reached in United States v. Fryer.
The Fryer court refused to uphold a conviction which, as an essential
element thereof, required the government to prove that the defendant had a prior felony conviction. 61 It reasoned that since the prior
conviction relied upon by the government had been set aside, the
conviction was vacated. The court stated that once a conviction is set

The time sequence in Mestre Morera gave rise to a second issue. Plaintiff had not been
discharged from his sentence at the time he began his suit against deportation. He tendered the
argument that his conviction was not final because of the possibility that it would be expunged
at a later date. ld. The court was spared ruling on this issue, however, since plaintiff did, in
fact, receive a discharge prior to his case reaching court, For a discussion of this issue, see
Hernandez-Vansuela v. Rosenberg, 304 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1962) (holding YCA conviction
to be final for deportation purposes),
57 462 F.2d at 1032.
58 Id. The court ruled that while the statute under which plaintiff was being deported, 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1970), provides that deportation based upon a narcotics conviction cannot
be prevented either by an executive pardon or a judicial recommendation of leniency, that
alone does not demonstrate a legislative intent that a § 5021 certificate be equally ineffective.
Id. at 1032.
59 462 F.2d at 1032.
60 402 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
61 Id. at 832. Defendant had pleaded guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 545 (smuggling
goods into United States) and was sentenced to three years probation. Although he was entitled
to be tried as a youth, defendant was prosecuted and convicted as an adult. Defendant was then
convicted of making a false statement to a firearms dealer. As an essential element of this
offense, the government was required to show that defendant had been previously convicted of
a felony. Id.
Defendant's conviction of smuggling was discharged by the trial court upon a recognition
that the youth should have been sentenced under the YCA, and an application of the Act
thereon. Defendant therefore sought to withdraw his guilty plea to making false statements to a
firearms dealer on the ground that he had never been convicted of a felons. id. at 831-32.
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aside under the Act, it is deleted from the offender's records "for all
62
purposes."
The rationale of Fryer was that one whose conviction has been
set aside possesses the same rights as one who has never been convicted. 63 The court noted the expungement nature of the YCA and
declared that, "[t]o give such a statute full force and effect, the event
expunged must be treated as if it never occurred." 64 Acknowledging
that the YCA departs from traditional punitive theories of dealing
with criminally inclined youth, the court found the Act to be "predicated on the concept that criminal youths require special treatment
because of the number and kinds of offenses they commit." 65 In
addition, youths sentenced under the Act and exposed to rehabilita66
tion offer a likelihood of becoming responsible adults.
In Doe v. Webster, the court examined whether Congress intended the records of set aside convictions to be destroyed or to remain generally accessible. In considering congressional intent, the
court weighed the competing interests of the rehabilitated youth
against those of law enforcement agencies seeking access to the con67
viction records.
The Webster court recognized its inherent authority to obliterate
arrest records in specidl circumstances. It stated that the decision to
delete arrest records must be determined by the facts of each case,
and a significant relationship must exist between the alleged injury to
the plaintiff and the maintenance of the records before expungement
62

Id. at837.

63

Id.

The court held that a youth whose conviction has been set aside is entitled to the

same right to possess firearms as any other citizen. A contrary conclusion would "state that the
youth has not been rehabilitated, that he cannot be trusted and that he does not deserve a
second chance." Id. The court believed such a result was inconsistent with the congressional
intent underlying the YCA.
64

Id. at 834.

Id. See also notes 21-27 supra and accompanying text.
402 F. Supp. at 837.
67 606 F.2d at 1241-45. The court balanced "the needs of law enforcement agencies and the
interests of rehabilitated youthful offenders under the Act." Id. at 1245. See Paton v. LaPrade,
524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1975). The Paton court stated that the factors to be balanced
are the accuracy and adverse nature of the information, the availability and scope of
dissemination of the records, the legality and the methods by which the information
was compiled, the existence of statutes authorizing the compilation and maintenance, and prohibiting the destruction, of recoreds [sic], and the value of the records to the Government.
Id. at 869.
It should be noted that the FBI's duty to preserve criminal records is statutory in nature.
28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (1979). Similarly, the Attorney General is statutorily obligated to collect criminal records and exchange them with appropriate agencies. 28 U.S.C. § 534 (1970).
65

66
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will be granted. 68 The court noted that generally arrest, as well as
conviction, records may be deleted "when serious governmental misbehavior leading to the arrest, or unusually substantial harm to the
defendant not in any way attributable to him, outweighs the government's need for a record of the arrest."- 69 Applying that test, the
court denied Doe's request for destruction of his arrest records. Expungement was held to be inappropriate in light of the fact that not
only was Doe's arrest constitutional in all respects, but the conviction
70
was also valid.
In contrast, however, the court did find merit in Doe's claim that
he was entitled to have his conviction record expunged. In its examination of case law involving the YCA, the court identified several
concepts repeatedly relied upon to deny destruction of conviction records. Each of those rationales was examined, and rejected, as a
sound basis for denying relief.
First, the court rejected the government's contention that "the
existence of a provision in section 5021(b) for the issuance of a certificate attesting to the set-aside of the conviction militates against a construction favoring expungement." 7 1 The certificates were not aimed
at the legal disabilities which accompany a conviction, but only to the
practical difficulties created by references to the conviction in newspaper files or credit reports. Nonetheless, the certificates were
considered to be of great benefit to the vouth. The court stressed that
they provide documentation which can lessen the effect of the offender s arrest and conviction. 72 As a practical matter, however, it was
opined that most employers would not "consider the niceties of a
set-aside certification." 73 Rather, the employers would continue to
68 606 F.2d at 1229-31.
69 Id. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("The judicial remedy of
expungement is inherent and is not dependent on express statutory provision, and it exists to
vindicate substantial rights provided by statute as well as by organic law."); Sullivan v. Murphy,
478 F.2d 938, 968 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973) (expungement available where
constitutional rights violated); United States v. McCleod, 385 F.2d 734, 749-50 (5th Cir. 1967)
(expungement proper where sole purpose of arrest was to harass defendant); Kowall v. United
States, 53 F.R.D. 211, 213 (W.D. Mich. 1971) ("the logic of the natural law of remedies does
not set arbitrary limits on a federal court's jurisdiction to right wrongs cognizable by the common law within the jurisdiction of the court").
70 606 F.2d at 1231.
71 Id. at 1232.
72 Id. at 1232-33. The court noted that the certificate is valuable to an offender whether or
not his record has been expunged. In either situation, the certificate would be evidence to
anyone who might have heard of the arrest and conviction from the media or from any other
source. Id. See Comment, supra note 31, at 564-65.
73 606 F,2d at 1240.
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act as they always have; that is, the youthful offender with the criminal record will be denied a second chance in terms of job opportunities. 74
The court was similarly unimpressed with the government's position that Congress would have specifically included the term expungement in the Act had it intended to authorize that power. It
noted that at the time the YCA was enacted, the word expungement
was not widely used. 75 Therefore, the absence of the term, and the
presence of set aside, were not necessarily indicative of the legislature's intent to enact a non-expungement statute. No evidence was
discovered by the court indicating an intention to distinguish between
setting aside and expunging a conviction. In fact, It~he contrary conclusion is far more plausible: that prior to the time the term ,expungement' became fashionable, Congress meant precisely that when
it directed conviction records be set aside upon the rehabilitation of
the youthful offender."76
Referring to the legislative history, the court also refuted the
government's argument that, under the YCA, a youthful offender is
entitled to no more than the removal of statutory disabilities which
attach to a criminal conviction. These include the loss of the right to
vote or to hold public office. 7 7 In its inquiry, the court found that
Congress directed little attention to these legal disabilities. Its primary concern was to ensure that youth be spared the social and
economic stigmas which in our society accompany the label of "excon."

78

The Webster court accepted that the YCA was intended to be an
expungement statute. It recognized that although traditionally expungement has been viewed as requiring the physical destruction of
records, under modern usage it encompasses more. 7 9 As construed
in Webster, the term "may be used to connote the removal of records
from the general mass of law enforcement files where they are most

74Id. See also Gough, supra note 27, at 153.
75 606 F.2d at 1233 & n.21. The court noted that the term "'expungement" did not apear in
the United States Code until 1966 and that expungement statutes did not become a common
form of statutory language until after the YCA hearings. See Comment, supra note 31, at 565.
76 606 F.2d at 1233.
77 Id. at 1233-34. See also Alestre Morera, 462 F.2d at 1032. But cf. Garcia-Gonzalez v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 344 F.2d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 1965) ("[w]hat the statute does
is reward the convict for good behavior during probation by releasing certain penalties and
disabilities.") (emphasis added).
78 606 F.2d at 1234. See also note 27 supra and accompanying text.
79 606 F.2d at 1241, 1243-44.
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likely to be accessible to the public." 80 Thus, instead of ordering the
destruction of Doe's conviction records, as expungement normally
would require, the court skirted that result by redefining the term.
The government maintained that by ordering expungement, the
court was rewriting history, and that by removing the conviction records, the court was interfering with governmental interests in keeping accurate historical records. 8 1 The assertion that expungement
rewrites history by officially declaring that an event never took place
was deemed by the court to be "inaccurate." It was recognized that
courts have often, in a variety of criminal and quasi-criminal situations, directed that events which occurred in fact be denied their
legal effects. 82 The court added that the obliteration of criminal records had also been ordered in instances where public policy or
equity required; yet in this case no justification was found for such a
83
holding.
Ultimately, the court based its decision not to order the destruction of Doe's conviction records on the "legitimate need for maintaining criminal records in order to efficiently conduct future criminal
investigations." 84 It believed that law enforcement officials have an
interest in, and will benefit by, knowing if a suspect in a crime has
been previously arrested and convicted. This was held by the court to
be particularly true where the crime under investigation involves a
85
similar offense or modus operandi.
In allowing the government access to records that have been set
aside, the Webster court gave greater deference to the government's
desire to maintain these records than to the individual's need to have
them destroved. 86 Arrest records, not expunged tinder the Act,
would already be within the government's control. 87 These would
satisfy the court's stated purpose for maintaining the conviction rec0

s

Id. at 1241. See notes 90 & 91 infra and accompanying text.
606 F.2d at 1241. The court recognized the government's interests. but was "satisfied that

the expungement remedy as herein defined may properly he applied without jeopardizing
legitimate law enforcement concerns." Id.
82 Id. The court stated that "the fact of the conviction would be given no legal effect but at
the same time it would not be obliterated as an historical event." (emphasis in original). Id. See
note 69 supra and accompanying text.
83 606 F.2d at 1241-43 and cases cited therein. See also note 69 supra and accompanying
text.
84 606 F.2d at 1243.

85 Id. See Hammons v. Scott, 423 F. Supp. 625, 627-78 (N.D. Cal. 1976); United States v.
Dooley, 364 F. Supp. 75, 77-79 (E.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Rosen, 343 F. Supp. 804,
809 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
86 606 F.2d at 1245. See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
87 606 F.2d at 1230-31. See note 69 supra and accompanying text.
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ords: to give the government.assistance in its criminal investigations,
especially where similar offenses are involved. 88 Additionally, under
Stevenson v. United States, fingerprints, photographs and other physical evidence of the arrest would remain in the government's possession. 8 9 Thus, an adequate pool of material would remain available
for use in governmental investigations, without the inclusion of conviction records set aside pursuant to the YCA.
The Webster court's opinion, requiring set aside conviction records to be physically removed from general arrest files, is more protective of youthful offenders than are prior court opinions. Past courts
have held that the Act is satisfied by simply placing a notation on the
conviction record indicating the conviction has been set aside. 90 Except for the notation, such records were treated like any others, and
were available for the same uses as other criminal records. The Webster court, however, directed that files containing records of set aside
convictions are "not to be opened other than in the course of a bona
fide criminal investigation by law enforcement authorities and where
necessary for such an investigation." 91 This two-fold test would not
permit, for example, the decision reached in Fite v. Retail Credit
Co., authorizing records of a set aside conviction to be used in
routine credit checks. 9 2 Although the court's holding advances the
purposes of the Act, it fails to justify a need for retaining the records
for any use.
In Doe v. Webster, the court recognized that the YCA was established to free reformed youthful offenders of "the economic, social,
and legal consequences which impair their reintegration into society." 93 Doe was clearly a member of the class of persons meant to
be protected by the Act, having shown by his behavior subsequent to
his arrest and conviction that he had earned a second chance, "free of
all taint of a [criminal] conviction." 9 4 Yet the Webster court failed to

See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 44-49 supra and accompanying text.
9o 606 F.2d at 1238 n.48. Addressing this practice, the court stated:

88

89

The plain fact is that-irrespective of notations and certifications -unless the
slate is wiped clean in such a way that the FBI will not disclose, and the youthful
ex-offender whose conviction was set aside may legally deny, the existence of that
previous conviction, he will almost inevitably and forever bear its stigma in terms of
both social relationships and economic opportunities.
Id. at 1239.
91 Id. at 1244.
92 See notes 50-55 supra and accompanying text.
93 606 F.2d at 1245.
94 Mestre Morera, 462 F.2d at 1032. See also Schaefer, supra note 21, at 31-32.
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give full credence to the individual's need to invoke the uncompromised force of a statute enacted for his protection.
The YCA dictated a result beyond that reached by the Webster
court. In balancing the competing interests involved in having the
conviction records destroyed, it is clear that the individual stands to
lose more by having these records remain available than the government does by having access denied. 9 5 If the government has a special interest in having access to the conviction records, greater and
more specific than evident here, it should seek legislative reform of
the YCA. As the YCA presently stands, records of convictions set
aside pursuant to the Act should be physically destroyed, making
them unavailable to any agency for any purpose.
Michael A. Bars

9'The Webster court found that the effect of retaining conviction records, and the duty to
answer questions affirmatively as to prior arrests, will be "relatively slight" to the youth. 606
F.2d at 1245 n.67. It based this opinion on the rationale that questions regarding prior arrests
are less frequently asked than those on convictions. Id. at 1244 n.61. In addition, arrest data
was noted to be distributed less freely than conviction information.

